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Summary and Keywords
This essay explores the well-known tension between the commitment to a state religion 
and expressions of tolerance for other religions. The background question concerns the 
consequences of state religion, the more suspect of the two commitments, at least with 
respect to intergroup relations. A useful conception of state religion is as a central part of 
an identity regime, which can take several forms in national constitutions. It seems likely 
that state religion—and other exclusive elements of identity regimes—threaten the na­
tional attachment of ethnic minorities in ways that unwind many of the benefits of toler­
ance provisions. A simple typology helps to understand the variation in these provisions 
across jurisdictions and over time, and original historical cross-national data on national 
constitutions describes this variation in some detail. The evidence suggests that the 
world’s constitutions are moving in strikingly divergent directions with respect to their 
provisions on religion.
Keywords: State religion, religious freedom, identity regime, constitution, official religion, secularism, intergroup 
conflict, politics and religion
The Paradox
The Iraqi Constitution of 2005 is noteworthy for what it tells us about the remarkable set­
ting in which it emerged. Recall that the authors of that document hashed out a plan for a 
new Iraq under conditions of simmering ethnic conflict and under the supervision of occu­
pying powers. The episode reminds us of a constitution’s unique ability to reflect the 
ideas swirling around important political and historical events. Indeed, such reflections 
may be what endear the genre to those of us who are its aficionados. Among the difficult 
questions that faced the Iraqi drafters was how exactly to reconcile their citizens’ reli­
gious commitments with the norms of liberal democracy. The outcome of such logical 
challenges can sometimes seem schizophrenic, or at least philosophically intriguing. So 
goes the Iraqi Constitution, which begins, unapologetically, with a set of arresting para­
doxes1:
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Article 2.
1. Islam is the official religion of the State and is a foundation source of legislation.
A. No law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of Islam.
B. No law may be enacted that contradicts the principles of democracy.
C. No law may be enacted that contradicts the rights and basic freedoms stipu­
lated in this Constitution.
2. This Constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi peo­
ple and guarantees the full religious rights to freedom of religious belief and practice 
of all individuals such as Christians, Yazidis, and Mandean Sabeans.
Article 3
Iraq is a country of multiple nationalities, religions, and sects. It is a founding 
and active member in the Arab League and is committed to its charter, and it 
is part of the Islamic world.
What one hand giveth, the other hand taketh away. Or so it seems. Left aside, for now, is 
the tension in Article 2.1 between the commitments to the people’s representatives and 
those to clerical authorities. That kind of democratic tension is covered well and often 
enough elsewhere.2
The focus here is on Article 2’s apparent tension between tolerance and identity forma­
tion. The freedom of religion expressed in Article 2.2 is an unambiguous expression of tol­
erance (if not inclusion); the clause even identifies specific groups to which the rights 
could potentially apply. But what to make of the official religion clause of Article 2.1, a 
common stipulation—it would seem—in national constitutions?
The establishment of an official religion, if it does anything, stakes out the boundaries of 
national identity. Like an official language or a restrictive citizenship law, it is part of a 
jurisdiction’s identity regime. Identity regimes, as conceptualized here, consist of rules 
and regulations that make explicit who is included and who is not included as prototypical 
nationals. Such regimes serve the purpose of staking out an identity. They answer, very 
clearly, ever-present questions about “Who are we?,” to echo the title of Samuel 
Huntington’s (2004) provocative book.
Of course, identity staking has its merits: a strong sense of a people and their past can be 
empowering and inspirational. Such empowerment can be especially relevant in a setting 
(such as a jurisdiction with a diverse populace) that desperately needs a sense of commu­
nity. But of course, identity staking is as much an expression of what one is not as it is of 
what one is. If one says that Iraqis are Muslims, what does one say about non-Muslims, if 
not that they are not Iraqi? What remains is a curious (and emphatic) combination of tol­
erance and exclusion. Any casual observer of the human condition, but especially those 
who follow social psychology, knows how important group identity is to an individual’s at­
titudes, behavior, and psychological health. And any observer of multiethnic states knows 
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the impact of such identity considerations on the health of democracy (see Horowitz, 
2000; or Lijphart, 1999).
This tension between tolerance and exclusion in a constitution raises all sorts of ques­
tions, the answers to which are not obvious. What led the Iraqis to the seeming incoher­
ence of Article 2? Precedent, one would think, for constitutions are hardly ever very origi­
nal. But from whence does this precedent spring? And if the original arguments of the 
predecessors were to be uncovered, from what factors did that incoherence evolve? One 
would suspect some sort of compromise among pluralists and clerical interests. But do 
the authors recognize the tension in their work, and, if so, how do they imagine future 
generations would resolve it? How common is this mix of tolerance and exclusion in na­
tional constitutions? Is the species to be found mostly in the Islamic world, historically 
and currently, or where else has it thrived? What are the implications and consequences 
of these provisions? It seems, then, that one question begets another, the root of which 
are some basic historical questions.
The primary concern here is with understanding the historical distribution of religious 
provisions, in their various combinations, in national constitutions. The source of analytic 
leverage is an original dataset on the content of national constitutions, which Elkins, 
Ginsburg, and Melton (2019 [2006]) have been gathering since 2005 as part of the Com­
parative Constitutions Project. The background assumption is that these patterns of iden­
tity staking have broad implications for the management of ethnic diversity. The looming 
question is whether exclusive forms of an identity regime—such as state religion clauses
—serve a disintegrative function in diverse states.
And of course it must be acknowledged that constitutions sometimes bear only a passing 
resemblance to what passes for law in the lives of their citizens and leaders. In the case 
of religion, Fox (2008) and others have found that the gap between preaching and prac­
tice can be substantial. Undoubtedly, constitutions matter under some conditions, but not 
others, and a productive line of inquiry is to understand these conditional patterns of en­
forcement. A threshold interpretive question in such an analytic exercise, of course, is to 
understand what the documents themselves say, whether or not they are works of fiction.
Alternative Conceptualizations of Religious 
Constitutionalism
Undoubtedly, scholars have already proposed helpful ways to think about differences in 
the way religion appears in written Constitutions. As a point of departure, consider the 
conceptualizations from two benchmark books on the topic in comparative politics, which 
serve as useful reference points. First, Ran Hirschl’s (2011) concept of constitutional 
theocracy. This breed of Constitutional approach, as Hirschl sees it, is evident to varying 
degrees in settings as diverse as Iran, Malaysia, and the Vatican. “Varying degrees,” is an 
important qualifier here, as Moustafa (2013) shows in the case of Malaysia. Nonetheless, 
for Hirschl, constitutional theocracies are arrangements that combine aspects of modern 
On the Paradox of State Religion and Religious Freedom
Page 4 of 21
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, POLITICS (oxfordre.com/politics). (c) Oxford University Press 
USA, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy Policy 
and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 14 November 2019
constitutionalism (especially judicial review) with a state religion, a religious doctrine 
that serves as a source of law, and a clerical body that stands ready to interpret that doc­
trine independently of the sitting government. This conceptualization allows one to think 
about the tension between a constitution and its interpreters, on the one hand, and a reli­
gious scripture and its interpreters, on the other. Another useful conceptualization is one 
that Gary Jacobsohn introduces in the Wheel of Law (2003), in order to understand Indian 
secularism. Jacobsohn’s two-by-two typology conjoins the degree of state impartiality with 
the salience and penetration of religion in society. As such, Jacobsohn’s typology shows 
how the impartiality of the Indian state differs from the same impartiality of the United 
States (just to take two cells), in that the salience of religious difference in India is sub­
stantially greater.
There are other ways to think about state approaches to religion, which may not depart 
radically from the Hirschl and Jacobsohn frameworks, though they emphasize different el­
ements. So, in an influential formulation, Stepan (2000) sees the organization of religion 
and politics as one of “twin tolerations,” that is, the state’s (a) tolerance of disparate wor­
ship behavior and religion’s (b) tolerance of state authority and autonomy. Lerner (2013), 
working in the Stepan tradition, surveys the instantiation of religion in four different con­
stitutions and codes the state as either permissive of different roles for religion, or more 
restrictive, with decidedly different consequences for interstate harmony.
Ferrari (2008), for his part, builds a typology that puts church establishment and church–
state separation at either ends of a spectrum, with cooperation as something of a middle 
category. It is quite possible that most of the action, at least in more modern, secular 
times, is between the middle category of cooperation, on the one hand, and full-on sepa­
ration, on the other. Indeed, Resende (2017) focuses on this range of variation in her 
study of three third-wave constitutions. She sees the Polish and Spanish constitutions as 
cooperative, in that they recognize a special role for the Catholic Church, without declar­
ing it official. By contrast, the arrangement in the Portuguese constitution is one of sepa­
ration, in that the state and the church are fully divorced. Her objective is to explain 
these different trajectories in what appear to be similar contexts.
Economists in recent years have resuscitated some nearly forgotten but intriguing argu­
ments by Adam Smith about religion, which have added another perspective. Adam Smith 
saw official state religion as something like a monopolist arrangement, which stifled the 
freedom of the religious market. As such, he expected that state religion would discour­
age religious adherence and participation for congregants who might prefer other spiritu­
al variants of faith. Stark and Bainbridge (1987), Finke and Stark (1992), Iannaccone 
(1991), North and Gwin (2004), Barro and McCleary (2005), and McCleary and Barro 
(2006) have elaborated this line of thinking in interesting ways and even marshaled the 
evidence to test these hypotheses, sometimes with discrepant results.
Probably the most nuanced and comprehensive conceptualization (and operationaliza­
tion) of church and state is that developed by Jonathan Fox (2008). Fox is the author of a 
rich data set on “religion and the state,” which covers various aspects of state laws and 
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procedures from 1990–2002. But he has also supplemented these data with a coding of 
constitutions in force in 2002 (Fox, 2011; Fox & Flores, 2009). For both sets of sources, 
Fox’s higher level categorization scheme sorts clauses into three broad kinds: those that 
provide for (a) freedom of worship, (b) non-discrimination on the basis of religion, and (c) 
state religion. Within these categories, Fox identifies sub-variants. So, constitutions may 
declare an official religion, but they could also speak of a religious “state,” or a “tradition­
al religion.” Within these possibilities, the modal category (almost 80% of those with 
something resembling state religion) is the simple declaration (Fox, 2011, p. 64), and it 
seems that the variants could be combined into a binary measure (as Fox does) without 
too much loss of information. Still, for some analyses, the nuances could matter. (Fox 
codes similar kinds of variation with respect to freedom of worship and non-discrimina­
tion.)
Another example of a more nuanced accounting is John Madeley’s (2003) filigreed discus­
sion of religious neutrality in the context of Europe. Madeley assembles archival data 
from Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson (2001), among others, to describe changes within Eu­
ropean states with respect to some 10 dimensions of church–state relations, including 
state subsidies to churches and political restrictions. Similarly, Grim and Finke (2006) 
have assembled a battery of measures for a larger (than Madeley’s) cross-section of coun­
tries, across three dimensions: (a) government regulation, (b) government favoritism, and 
(c) social regulation of religion.
A Simple Typology of Constitutional Approach­
es
Together, these studies present a rich and varied description of the relationship between 
church and state, each study with its interesting individual wrinkles. At the highest level 
of generalization, two basic dimensions run through these frameworks: (a) the positive es­
tablishment, or not, of a state religion; and (b) the provision for freedom to worship, pre­
sumably without discriminatory regulation. These basic dimensions make sense for our 
purposes here, where our interest lies in the broad strokes that one finds in national con­
stitutions—the broad symbolic statements of an identity regime.
If these two dimensions are crossed, a set of four basic approaches to religion in constitu­
tional law (Figure 1) emerges. The type in the northwest corner is, of course, the intrigu­
ing species described above—a combination of state religion and religious freedom (call 
this type competing or dual commitment, for lack of a better label). The liberal type is that 
embodied most classically by the U.S. Constitution and increasingly prevalent in modern 
constitutions—one espousing religious freedom and declining to name a state religion (or 
even forbidding such). The right column (no religious freedom) includes two interesting 
combinations. Those with an official religion, but without religious freedom, would seem 
to indicate a dogmatic approach—that is, constitutions of either a theocratic state or a ho­
mogenous one (a result of such a theocracy, perhaps). The fourth type distinguishes itself 
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Figure 1.  A simple typology of the constitutionaliza­
tion of religion. From author’s own data.
by its absence of religious content: these are constitutions that are silent on religion alto­
gether, as if religion were somehow irrelevant to higher law.
Data and Measurement
One can describe the distribution of cases across these four types, across space and time, 
with original data on the content of historical constitutions from the Comparative Consti­
tutions Project (Elkins, Ginsburg, & Melton, 2019 [2006]). The CCP’s data collection 
process involves the following steps: (a) the development of a chronology of constitutional 
events (replacements, amendments, suspensions, etc.) for each independent country 
since 1789; (b) the collection of each of the texts associated with these events; (c) devel­
opment of a conceptual inventory of constitutional topics and provisions; (d) preparation 
of a survey instrument for coding texts; (e) coding of written constitutions by two inde­
pendent coders; and (f) reconciliation of instances of non-agreement by coders.
The sample analyzed here includes 734 of the 849 constitutions written between 1789 
and 2018, as well as 2,590 of the 2,706 amendments to these documents. The sample is 
drawn from all independent states as identified by Gleditsch and Ward (1999). The identi­
fication of the “written constitution” requires some judgment. For the vast majority of 
states, the formal or nominal constitution in place is analyzed; for the small number of 
states that do not have a formal constitution in a single document those statutes that cre­
ate a branch of government or articulate a bill of rights are treated as “constitutional”; 
these are laws that are presumed to be core parts of higher law. Thus, the corpus in­
cludes the Human Rights Act of the United Kingdom in 1998 or the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act, because these countries do not have single codified constitutions. However, 
statutory rights are not included. The intention here is to limit analysis to the 
“highest” (most foundational and most entrenched) set of norms in the jurisdiction.
The particular interpretive question is whether the constitution declares an official reli­
gion and whether it provides for religious freedom. As with any classification, there are 
boundary cases with respect to each of these judgments, some of which are recorded in 
the data. In particular, with respect to state religion, an intermediate category codes 
whether a constitution singles out a religion for special treatment as opposed to declaring 
the religion official (see examples). The coding for religious freedom is less nuanced; the 
question is simply whether the constitution declares religious freedom in clear and gener­
al terms.
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Figure 2.  Official religion and religious freedom veer 
in two different directions in Latin America. From 
Comparative Constitutions Project. Sample/Universe: 
n = 787 of 961 known constitutional systems (and 
their amendments), 1830–2016.
The Contours of State Religion and Religious 
Freedom
Evidently, commitments to an official religion and religious freedom are both on display in 
the early constitutions of the modern state era, albeit to different degrees. One can get a 
sense of the distribution of cases from Figure 2, which plots, separately, for Latin America 
the proportion of those constitutions with state religion and those with religious freedom. 
Latin America is an analytically useful subgroup because its population of states is fairly 
stable across the last 200 years. Figure 2 shows a striking X-like pattern: evidently, in 
Latin America at least, state religion and religious freedom have trended in two very dif­
ferent directions. The graph shows that throughout most of the 19th century, most Latin 
American countries provided for a state religion, but not religious freedom. Of course, the 
reverse is now true, which is part of what elicits raised eyebrows at dual-commitment 
states.
State religion is decidedly an endangered species in Latin America these days. As of July 
2015, Argentina and Costa Rica are the only constitutions in Latin America with an offi­
cial religion stipulation in their constitutional text. Importantly, both are older constitu­
tions: Argentina’s dates from 1853, and Costa Rica’s from 1949. Those late vintages re­
mind us that state religion used to be the norm, and not just in Latin America. In 1850, 13 
of 18 Latin American constitutions identified a state religion. Also, the remnants of state 
religion in the region’s older constitutions remind us that the generation of a constitution 
matters as to its content, as does its morbidity. Old ideas die more easily in constitutional 
systems with more reform “churn,” in which the frequency of reform is high.
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Figure 3.  Official religion and religious freedom 
alive and well in the Middle East and North Africa. 
From Comparative Constitutions Project. Sample/
Universe: n = 53 of 59 known constitutional systems 
(and their amendments) in the Middle East and 
North Africa, 1945–2016.
A Tale of Two Regions
The Latin American historical data suggest that state religion, once vibrant, is in decline 
and has been replaced presumably by statements of religious freedom and non-discrimi­
nation. In this sense, the Latin American data fit with a priori expectations about the 
trending role of religion in modern constitutions more generally.
But the Latin American trend turns out to be not especially representative. Consider the 
same provisions for constitutions from the Middle East and North Africa3 (Figure 3). In 
this set of countries, official religion is alive and well. In fact, official religion is even more 
common in these countries than is freedom of religion.
Trends by Type
The independent trends for state religion and freedom of religion are telling. But observ­
ing them jointly explains something about the distribution of constitutions into the four 
categories described above. Figure 4 shows this distribution, for all countries, over time. 
The most striking story is one that was presaged, to some degree, by the trends above. 
That is, that the liberal form, though comparatively rare early in the 1800s has become 
the dominant form in modern constitutions. This trend comes at the expense of the steadi­
ly fading silent approach. Although almost 80% of countries’ constitutions were silent 
about religion in 1840, only 11% were so in 2000. Religion, in some form, plays a role in 
most modern constitutions.
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Figure 4.  Constitutional approaches to religion, over 
time. From Comparative Constitutions Project. Sam­
ple/Universe: n = 787 of 961 known constitutional 
systems, 1830–2016.
Meanwhile, the dogmatic class seems to have dropped precipitously in the early 20th cen­
tury. Today only 10 constitutions have an official religion without an expressed freedom of 
religion. This class includes Libya (1969), Iran (1979), and Saudi Arabia (1991).4 This de­
cline stands in contrast to a larger and more stable group of cases that continue to exhib­
it the state-religion–tolerance paradox. Today, 24 constitutions include both provisions. Of 
these, 14 constitutions proclaim Islam as the official state religion, five claim Catholicism, 
three Protestantism, one Buddhism, and one country-specific denomination (Armenian 
Apostolic).5
Among constitutions in the Middle East and North Africa regions, the dual commitment 
and dogmatic classes have always been significant (Figure 5). Now, however, the two to­
gether make up the lion’s share of cases (81%). Dual commitment does indeed have a 
long history in Islamic higher law. Turkey’s constitution of 1876, famously, exhibited such. 
Egypt’s constitution of 1923 continued this practice, followed by Iraq in 1925. After World 
War II, many of the new states in the region carried on the practice (e.g., Jordan [1946], 
Syria [1950], Libya [1951], Tunisia [1959], and so on).
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Figure 5.  Patterns of classification in the Middle 
East and North Africa. From Comparative Constitu­
tions Project. Sample/Universe: n = 60 of 76 known 
constitutional systems (and their amendments) in the 
Middle East and North Africa, 1945–2016.
State Religion: Where and When
Here the focus returns to those countries that provide for state religion, whether or not it 
is balanced with religious freedom. Figures 6 and 7 show each and every spell since 1789 
in which a national constitution has provided for an official state religion. For presenta­
tion purposes, the figures are divided roughly by the year of adoption; most early adopt­
ing countries are depicted in Figure 6 and most late adopting countries in Figure 7.
In preparation for future analyses, it might be interesting to identify periods of shift as 
possible points of leverage in assessing effects. In this respect, among the cases of long-
term state religion, three cases stand out: the United Kingdom, Bolivia, and Paraguay 
have all dispensed with state religion after centuries with such. Note that in the United 
Kingdom, a shift is coded in 1998 from a declaration of official religion to an intermediate 
position of favoring a particular religion. Clearly, the Church of England still enjoys spe­
cial status, but the codification of U.K. constitutional documents in 1998 has made it clear 
that in the United Kingdom, if not England, there is no state religion. On the flip side, Fig­
ure 7 depicts a set of countries that have adopted state religion clauses in the last 20 
years: Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, Yemen People’s Republic, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, and 
Armenia. In between the recent and long-term cases, one finds a set of jurisdictions that 
are no doubt interesting in their own right.
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Figure 6.  Constitutionalized state religion: Where 
and when? (Part I). From Comparative Constitutions 
Project. Sample/Universe: n = 809 of 1,110 known 
constitutional systems (and their amendments), 
1800–2016.
Figure 7.  Constitutionalized state religion: Where 
and when? (Part II). From Comparative Constitutions 
Project. Sample/Universe: n = 787 of 961 known con­
stitutional systems, 1830–2016.
The Language of State Religion
So how is state religion expressed in constitutions? And how has this changed over time? 
One of the first modern (i.e., post-1787) Constitutions to provide for state religion was the 
Haitian charter of 1801, a radical text in many ways. Among other things, it emphatically 
outlawed slavery and declared Toussaint Louverture governor for life (apparently at 
Alexander Hamilton’s suggestion). To digress, the governor-for-life clause reads: “Per the 
wishes of the grateful inhabitants, the reins are confided to him for the rest of his glori­
ous life” (Haiti, 1801, Article 28). This ad hominem clause, as interesting as it is, is 
relevant to our story. Toussaint, as it happens, was deeply averse to the then-widescale 
practice of voodoo, which led to his preference for a state religion (Catholicism, of 
course). Article 6 from the Haitian text, thus, states:
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Article 6. The Catholic religion, Apostolic and Roman, is the only one publicly pro­
fessed (Haiti, 1801).
The early European Constitutions, whose clergy were very much at the table in constitu­
tional deliberations (see Elkins, 2010), also carved out an official space for religion (e.g., 
Spain, 1912; Norway, 1814; and Portugal, 1822). Norway’s text, some will know, is still in 
operation after 200 years (though it should be noted that it is written in a dialect of Nor­
wegian that is no longer spoken or written, except for constitutional reforms). Norway’s 
Article 2, in 1814, read as such:
Article 2. The Evangelical Lutheran Religion shall remain the official religion of 
the State. Inhabitants who profess the same shall be required to educate their 
children therein, Jesuits and Monastic orders shall have no place in the country 
(Norway, 1814).
Amendments have since diluted the singular dedication to Evangelical Lutheranism and 
any distrust of the Jesuits. Article 16, the heir to Article 2, now reads as follows:
Article 16. The Norwegian church, an Evangelical-Lutheran church, shall remain 
the Norwegian National Church and will as such be supported by the State. De­
tailed provisions as to its system shall be laid down by law. All religious and philo­
sophical communities are to be supported on an equal footing (Norway, 1814).
The Norwegian amendment is now par for the course among modern state-religion claus­
es, many of which tack on a nod to non-discrimination after professing a preference for a 
religion. So, for example, Liechtenstein’s (1921 constitution):
Article 372(2). The Roman Catholic Church is the State Church and as such enjoys 
the full protection of the State; other confessions shall be entitled to practice their 
creeds and to hold religious services to the extent consistent with morality and 
public order (Liechtenstein, 1921).
Compare the Liechtenstein clause to the remarkably similar Article 75 from Costa Rica’s 
constitution (1949):
Article 75. The Roman, Catholic, Apostolic Religion is that of the State, which con­
tributes to its maintenance, without preventing the free exercise in the Republic of 
other beliefs that do not oppose themselves to the universal morality or good cus­
toms (Costa Rica, 1949).
Other constitutions maintain the simplicity evident in the Haitian wording of 1801. Wit­
ness Argentina’s Article 2, originally penned in 1853:
Article 2. The Federal Government supports the Roman Catholic Apostolic Faith 
(Argentina, 1853).
Or the somewhat more presumptuous but non-specific pronouncement in Indonesia’s Ar­
ticle 291:
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Article 291(1). The State shall be based upon the belief in the One and Only God 
(Indonesia, 1945).
Among predominantly Islamic countries, the first expression of an official religion was 
that in the Ottoman Empire’s constitution of 1876, Article 11, which reads as follows:
Article 11. Islam is the state religion. But, while maintaining this principle, the 
state will protect the free exercise of faiths professed in the Empire, and uphold 
the religious privileges granted to various bodies, on condition of public order and 
morality not being interfered with (Ottoman Empire, 1876).
The Ottoman’s well-reputed tolerance is evident in the last refrain, which sets out a guar­
antee of religious freedom conditional on public order and morality, a conditional freedom 
repeated in later constitutions. The Egyptian constitution of 1923, on the other hand, 
reads more simply. Its Article 149 states:
Article 149. The religion of the state is Islam. Arabic is the official language 
(Egypt, 1923).
This simplicity seems to have carried through to the Arab Spring texts. So, Tunisia 
(2014), the springboard of the Arab Spring reads as follows:
Article 1. Tunisia is a free, independent, sovereign state; its religion is Islam, its 
language Arabic, and its system is republican (Tunisia, 2014).
All of these provisions of state religion have one thing in common. They are all simple ex­
pressions of a particular cultural basis for state identity, in the same way that state lan­
guage and ancestral citizenship clauses are.
Not-Quite State Religion
The foregoing string of excerpts may give the impression that constitutions either provide 
state religion, or not. But, like everything else, state religion is not like the proverbial 
pregnancy. One intermediate category, at least, is one that the author and his collabora­
tors in the CCP have identified as expressions of religious preference or favoritism. These 
expressions fall short of official status, but their implication may be clear enough that 
some might consider the two species as effectively equal. Again, the shift observed in the 
United Kingdom in 1998 to preference as against officialdom for the Church of England is 
one that some may not see as a significant change.
The intermediate case is, admittedly, a minority, but not a tiny one. Some 41 (or 5%) of 
the 725 historical constitutions in our sample identify a religion for special treatment. 
(Note that the sample was obtained from an estimated universe of 860 constitutions writ­
ten since 1789).
Article 21 of Burma’s independence constitution of 1947 falls in this category:
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Article 21.(1) The State recognizes the special position of Buddhism as the faith 
professed by the great majority of the citizens of the Union.
(2) The State also recognizes Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and Animism as some 
of the religions existing in the Union at the date of the coming into operation of 
this Constitution.
(3) The State shall not impose any disabilities or make any discrimination on the 
ground of religious faith or belief.
(4) The abuse of religion for political purposes is forbidden; and any act which is 
intended or is likely to promote feelings of hatred, enmity or discord between 
racial or religious communities or sects is contrary to this Constitution and may be 
made punishable by law (Burma, 1947).
The evolution of the Burmese story has some exciting twists and turns. Any ambivalence 
about official religion in the 1947 constitution was settled by an amendment in 1961, 
which attempted to institutionalize the observance and protection of Buddhism in Myan­
mar. In that amendment, Article 21(1) was upgraded to simply state, “Buddhism, being 
the religion professed by the great majority of the citizens of the Union, shall be the State 
religion.” The drafters elaborated what, exactly, state religion meant in an addendum to 
Article 21 (Articles 21a through 21d):
Article 21a. Buddhism being the State religion of the Union, the Union Govern­
ment shall:
(i) promote and maintain Buddhism for its welfare and advancement in its three as­
pects, namely, pariyatti sasana (study of the Teachings of the Buddha), patipatti 
sasana (practice of the Teachings), and pativedha sasana (enlightenment);
(ii) honour the Tiratana, namely, the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha;
(iii) protect the said religion in its three aspects and the Tiratana from all dangers 
including insult and false representation, made by words, either spoken or written, 
or by other means.
(ii) honour the Tiratana, namely, the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha;
(iii) protect the said religion in its three aspects and the Tiratana from all dangers 
including insult and false representation, made by words, either spoken or written, 
or by other means (Burma, 1961).
Articles 21b–d continued by stipulating how the state would maintain and preserve the 
teachings and texts of the clergy in some detail. The effect, to the author at least, is to 
clarify that the slight shift in language (to “state religion”) in Article 21 was no mistake.
Nevertheless, to continue the Burmese saga, the 1961 amendments would be short-lived 
(witness the hardly perceptible dot on Figure 7. In 1962, the Burmese socialists took pow­
er and installed their own constitution. Not surprisingly, perhaps, almost any mention of 
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the opiate of the masses—much less that of a state religion—was removed. The freedom 
of religion and conscience was all that was preserved.
But constitutional cycles are such that ideas rarely die; they just hibernate. Come 2008, 
the socialists were long gone, and the Burmese military was ready to christen a new con­
stitution. This would be a text 18 years in the making, much of it done well behind the 
scenes, in a town removed from the capital city. And after 18 years of writing, the docu­
ment was finally ratified by election on the day of a massive typhoon. Of course, the mili­
tary would not postpone the vote that day, and it is hard to imagine a more ill-fated begin­
ning to a constitutional system. Many know the document for what it says about the selec­
tion of the executive. That is, that the president, according to Article 59(f), cannot have 
any foreign attachment or citizenship, a clause that effectively prevents Aung San Suu Kyi 
from assuming the office. More relevant here, however, is that the drafters returned to 
their 1947 roots regarding religion. Articles 361 and 362 are identical to the clauses of 
the 1947’s Article 21 regarding the special status—but not official religion—of Buddhism. 
Compare the following from Burma’s 2008 Constitution to the first two clauses of the 
1947 text’s Article 21 above:
Article 361. The Union recognizes special position of Buddhism as the faith pro­
fessed by the great majority of the citizens of the Union.
Article 362. The Union also recognizes Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Animism 
as the religions existing in the Union at the day of the coming into operation of 
this Constitution.
Any differences must be due to translation.
State Religion: Never Ever!
Of course, there is a third way to approach state religion, and that is to outlaw it. Most 
readers will be familiar with the opening lines of the first amendment to the U.S. Consti­
tution (1789): “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” 
Since 1789, 127 (17%) of the 725 historical constitutions in the sample herein have had 
such a clause.
These clauses, quite possibly, make for interesting reading and analysis unto themselves. 
However, such analysis is left for another day or another scholar. But consider the Haitian 
clause of 1805, which brings us full circle. It turns out that Haiti was not only one of the 
first constitutions to enshrine a national religion (in 1801), but it was also one of the first 
to forbid such in Article 50 of its subsequent constitution of 1805, which stated simply, 
“The law admits of no predominant religion.” Such is both the high frequency of Haitian 
constitutional reform (25 constitutions since 1801 by our count) and its cyclic nature, that 
the country would come back to state religion in two subsequent constitutions (1807 and 
1816). Its other constitutions were mostly silent regarding official religion (13 cases of 
such), or accorded Catholicism special treatment (1888 and 1935). The 1805 constitution 
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is the only one to expressly deny official religion. (Note that there are six Haitian consti­
tutions that the author has not read and interpreted.)
Conclusions
This march through national constitutions, past and present, clears some brush and iden­
tifies areas for future inquiry. The trends in state religion and religious freedom are quite 
clear. In most of the world, the first has been in decline, whereas the second is nearly uni­
versal. But it should be noted that the global view can be deceiving, something which is 
clear once one compares Latin America to the Middle East–North Africa. Latin America 
very much represents the divergent paths of state religion and religious freedom. The 
Middle East, on the other hand, suggests that both commitments are thriving in at least 
that particular habitat.
All that, of course, is an analysis of the two variables independently. The combination of 
these two provisions allows one to say something about the prevalence of different 
species in the arrangement of constitutional laws on religion. Through a simple typology, 
four types of arrangements that lie at the intersection of the two dimensions are evident. 
The motivating concern, of course, has been with the dual commitment to state religion 
and religious freedom, which seems incoherent. However, some equally interesting com­
binations emerge—namely, the dogmatic, silent, and liberal approaches to religion.
Conceptualization and description is the starting place here, but a more ambitious goal is 
to reach for the consequences of these commitments. The background assumption in this 
article is that state religion and religious freedom have potentially strong effects on the 
attachment of religious minorities to the state. Religious freedom may reassure minorities 
of their practice of their way of life, but perhaps at the expense of reinforcing differences. 
A state religion, meanwhile, communicates very powerfully that religious minorities are 
indeed out-groups. So how to test these hypotheses? One productive avenue would be to 
assess these effects experimentally, ideally in a design that mimics state membership cri­
teria. Another complementary approach would be to assess, observationally, the corre­
lates of these instances of exclusive identity regimes. These research agendas should illu­
minate some of the consequences of identifying—constitutionally—groups as insiders and 
outsiders.
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Notes:
(1.) The source for this and other contemporary (in-force) constitutional text is the web­
site Constitute (Elkins, Ginsburg, Melton 2019 [2013]), online at constituteproject.org. 
Links are “deep links” to the particular excerpt.
(2.) There is a lively debate about the compatibility of religious commitments with those 
to democracy. An incomplete list of contributors might include Stepan (2000), Hirschl 
(2011), Braithwaite and Bramsen (2011), Brown (2012), Driessen (2010), and Fox (2007).
(3.) Regional categorizations always include some element of arbitrariness regarding cut­
off points. Here a regional categorization that the authors developed is used, which, to 
them, is more satisfactory than most.
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(4.) The full list of 10 includes Mauritania, Somalia, Comoros, Algeria, Libya, Iran, Israel, 
Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Maldives.
(5.) The Armenian Apostolic Church seems to have been associated with Armenia in an of­
ficial capacity since the 400s CE.
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